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Bargaining is the motor of coalition politics. Indeed, negotiation takes place across the 
lifetime of a coalition (Lupia and Strøm, 2008: 58), though the literature to date has 
focused on its role in government formation. During this stage, the prospective partners 
must, at a minimum, ‘agree on which parties will participate in the government and on 
the division of cabinet offices. Otherwise, no government could assume office’ (Müller 
and Strøm, 2008: 159). The question of ‘Who gets in?’ has received considerable 
attention from scholars, many of whom employ game theoretical approaches to predict 
bargaining outcomes based on the proximity of the parties’ policy preferences (e.g. 
Axelrod, 1970; de Swaan, 1973), or to analyse the relation between these preferences 
and the government that is eventually formed (e.g. Budge and Keman, 1990; Laver and 
Schofield, 1998). Other coalition theorists, meanwhile, have modelled the allocation of 
ministerial positions (‘who gets what?’), linking this to portfolio saliency (e.g. Bäck et 
al., 2010) and to the prestige attached to different cabinet posts (e.g. Warwick and 
Druckman, 2001; Druckman and Roberts, 2005).   
 
The parties engaged in bargaining to form a coalition face a dilemma between ‘seeking 
office and seeking votes’ (Narud, 1996: 499). In other words, entering into a governing 
partnership requires compromise, but the parties must also be able to compete for votes 
on the basis of a distinct programmatic stance (Narud, 1996: 520-1). This puzzle 
corresponds to the unity-distinctiveness dilemma, which confronts the partners during 
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the governance and termination phases of the coalition life cycle. Here, the parties need 
to work together to govern effectively and present a united public front, while 
‘maintain[ing] their political distinctiveness, and hence electoral viability’ (Boston and 
Bullock, 2012: 350). The tension between co-operation and conflict, unity and 
distinctiveness, thus pervades the ongoing process of coalition bargaining, and it must 
be managed if agreements with the governing partner are to be formed and maintained. 
This in turn suggests that inter-party bargaining is more complex than analyses of 
payoff distribution are able to capture.  
 
Lupia and Strøm (2008: 59) define bargaining as ‘a process by which actors engage in 
communication for the purpose of finding a mutually beneficial agreement’. Yet it is 
precisely this communicative dimension which is neglected in the model-based studies 
that constitute much of the scholarship on coalition bargaining. The article begins to 
redress this lacuna by proposing an analytical framework in which coalition bargaining 
is conceptualised as a negotiation dialogue between the (prospective) governing 
partners. This dialogue takes place in conditions of uncertainty, and the parties must 
choose whether to co-operate, or enter into conflict, with each other based on their 
understanding of the situation at hand. As argued below, language is both a source of 
this tension and a means for managing it, so the framework developed here offers a new 
perspective on the unity-distinctiveness dilemma. The role of communicative 
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interaction is overlooked in the literature, which focuses on the institutional 
mechanisms for dealing with this challenge (e.g. Boston and Bullock, 2012; Hazell and 
Yong, 2012), thereby enabling the article to contribute to a second area of coalition 
studies.     
 
The core contention of this article is that rhetoric is key to managing the competing 
dynamics of unity and distinctiveness that permeate coalition bargaining. It takes as its 
starting point Burke’s theory of rhetoric as identification, which captures the myriad 
ways in which ‘the members of a group promote social cohesion by acting rhetorically 
upon themselves and one another’ (1969: xiv). This account supplements and goes 
beyond the classical notion of rhetoric as persuasion, and so is suitable for analysing the 
ongoing negotiation dialogue of coalition politics. The first section of the article lays the 
theoretical groundwork for this approach. It then distinguishes three forms of 
identification and division at work within coalition bargaining, namely: ideological, 
which is concerned with values; instrumental, which is founded on political expediency; 
and interpersonal, which focuses on the relations between individuals or groups. In the 
final section, the framework is applied to the 2010 Conservative-Liberal Democrat 
negotiations on electoral reform. This case is chosen because a number of those 
involved in, or close to, the talks have published detailed accounts1, which permit the 
analysis of verbatim quotations. The application of the framework demonstrates the 
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utility of a rhetorical approach to the study of coalition bargaining, while bringing the 
relational dimension of coalition politics to the fore. 
 
Dialogue, rhetoric and identification 
 
Through dialogue, agents may identify and define an issue, and eventually develop a 
shared understanding. This in turn provides a basis for co-ordinated action (Black, 
2002: 181). There will, of course, be dialogues that do not work, where the participants 
are unwilling or unable to arrive at a mutually acceptable understanding of the problem 
at hand (Black, 2002: 182). In these situations, the speakers may agree to differ and co-
operation does not follow. Dialogue takes place within a context of ambiguity, where 
meanings are not fixed and situations can be interpreted in a variety of ways (Hajer and 
Laws, 2006). Consequently, actors must identify the issues at stake before they can 
begin to address them. This process of selectively emphasising aspects of a situation can 
be understood through the concept of the frame. Hajer and Laws explain (2006: 259) 
that frames are ‘expressed by individuals, but also rooted in and sustained by social 
interaction’. On this view, the ordering of complex realities is relational, a product of 
language use, and the sharing of a frame both reinforces and perpetuates its 
interpretation of the issue at hand.  
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One approach to the study of dialogue is discourse analysis, which focuses on the 
‘dynamic, often temporally changeable meanings that shape social practices and that are 
actively transformed across time and space’ (Martin, 2014: 11). It also attends to the 
role of discourses in shaping us as subjects (e.g. as ‘politician’ or ‘protester’) and 
creating positions from which we can speak (or not). Given that discourse theory 
operates with a relational ontology, it appears well suited to an investigation of how the 
participants in a dialogue form an interpretation of an issue, and of ‘what 
understandings are shared and by whom … [and] which are contested and between 
whom’ (Black, 2012: 196). However, this perspective pays insufficient attention to the 
questions of why certain frames and discourses come to be accepted over others, and of 
how these dominant interpretations are contested, transformed and (perhaps) 
superseded.2 To address them, we need to enter the realm of rhetorical analysis. 
 
Rhetoric is concerned with ‘the study of how, in politics, we come to conceive a 
situation in a certain way, and of how we may get others to conceive it similarly (such 
that they may act in concert with us)’ (Finlayson, 2006: 544). There are several 
approaches to rhetorical study (e.g. Atkins, 2011; Finlayson, 2006; Martin, 2014: ch. 6) 
but, for our purposes, the most relevant is Burke’s theory of language as symbolic 
action. This theory proceeds from the premise that ‘language reflects, selects, and 
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deflects as a way of shaping the symbol systems that allow us to cope with the world’ 
(Stob, 2008: 139). In other words, it directs our attention to some aspects of a situation 
over others, and so affords us a means of dealing with ambiguity. This function is 
captured in the concept of a ‘terministic screen’, which orders reality according to the 
principles of continuity and discontinuity (Burke, 1966: 50). As Burke puts it (1966: 
49), there are ‘terms that put things together, and terms that take things apart’. 
Crucially, terministic screens – like other ordering devices – may be contested; after all, 
‘there can be different screens, each with its ways of directing the attention and shaping 
the range of observations implicit in the given terminology’ (Burke, 1966: 50).  
 
It is through the opposing principles of continuity and discontinuity that ‘A can feel 
himself [sic] identified with B, or he can think of himself as disassociated from B’ 
(Burke, 1966: 49). This statement calls attention to the relational aspect of Burke’s 
theory, at the heart of which is the concept of identification. Here, Burke writes (1969: 
46):  
 
A speaker persuades an audience by the use of stylistic identifications; his [sic] 
act of persuasion may be for the purpose of causing the audience to identify 
itself with the speaker’s interests; and the speaker draws on identification of 
interests to establish rapport between himself and his audience.  
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There is a strategic element involved, as a speaker will select the signs they believe are 
most likely to appeal to their audience, and so increase the likelihood of identification 
occurring. If identification between two people is achieved, they are said to be 
‘consubstantial’: their interests are joined and yet each remains distinct, an ‘individual 
locus of motives’ (Burke, 1969: 21). Such consubstantiality then provides a basis for co-
operative action.  
 
Burke’s theory is appropriate to the analysis of the negotiation dialogue between the 
(prospective) partners in a coalition government, which takes place in conditions of 
ambiguity. In seeking to order reality, political actors will use a terministic screen based 
on either continuity or discontinuity. This choice lies at the root of the unity-
distinctiveness dilemma, as figures from one party must decide whether to co-operate 
with, or distance themselves from, the other. If they opt for unity, they need to achieve 
identification with their partner and so facilitate co-operation. Conversely, a strategy 
based on distinctiveness requires the rhetoric of division, which emphasises the 
differences between the parties and facilitates the reassertion of a separate identity. For 
the purposes of this article, the concepts of identification and division are disaggregated 
into three forms – ideological, instrumental and interpersonal – all of which feature in 
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the negotiation dialogue that takes place within coalition governments. These three 
modes of identification and division are examined next.                 
 
Ideological identification and division  
 
According to Budge and Laver (1986: 607), the ‘parties’ ideological closeness or policy 
agreement is regarded [by many scholars] as indispensable to the coalition’s formation 
and stability’. Despite this, they continue (1986: 608), analysts rarely treat ideology as a 
variable in its own right, and instead rely on ‘admittedly static and imperfect 
representations’ of the parties’ core commitments and policy positions. Budge and 
Laver’s criticism is borne out by studies that conceive of ideologies as ‘policy 
motivations’ (Laver and Schofield, 1998: 111) or count them among the parties’ 
‘preferences’ (Müller et al., 2008). From the perspective of rhetorical analysis, this 
neglect of ideology is a serious oversight. After all, ideologies are not simply systems of 
ideas that shape political thinking; they also ‘provide actors with a series of locally 
established “commonplace” arguments, which must be adapted to the demands of the 
situation’. Furthermore, an ideology supplies a set of criteria for evaluating whether an 
argument is good or bad (Finlayson, 2012: 759), whether it constitutes an appropriate 
means of inviting identification. Alongside these functions, ideology gives an indication 
of how a party might envisage common ground with a coalition partner, as well as of 
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the tensions that may arise between them.3 An appreciation of the ideological dimension 
of coalition politics can therefore shed new light on the competing dynamics of unity 
and distinctiveness that characterise the negotiation dialogue between the parties 
involved.  
 
The ambiguity of the political environment is mirrored in the inherent contestability of 
the concepts present within an ideology. As Freeden explains (1998: 54), the 
interpretations attached to these political concepts are derived from a potentially 
limitless and essentially contestable assortment of meanings, and thus will exhibit a 
wide range of variations. The ideological response to this conceptual indeterminacy 
takes the form of ‘decontestation’, a process whereby a specific meaning is assigned to 
each of the concepts that comprise an ideology (Freeden, 1998: 83). Political actors then 
make use of these decontested concepts in their efforts both to order reality and to 
persuade others to accept their definition of the issue. In Burke’s terms, a politician will 
employ a terministic screen that stresses the continuity between, say, a policy proposal 
and a value it is intended to realise. If a (prospective) coalition partner accepts this 
interpretation, their shared understanding provides a basis for ideological identification. 
The parties’ consubstantiality then paves the way for co-ordinated action. Although 
ideological proximity is a key determinant of coalition formation and durability, it may 
come at the cost of electoral distinctiveness – particularly for the smaller party. Hence, 
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the latter may utilise a terministic screen that emphasises the discontinuity between their 
values and an initiative proposed by the senior partner, and so directs attention to the 
ideological differences that exist between the parties.  
    
Through rhetorical strategising, political actors may play on the ambiguity of 
ideological claims to bring together competing demands (Atkins, 2011: 94), and thus 
attain consubstantiality. For instance, a socialist may invite identification with a liberal 
by arguing that their preferred policy will promote ‘equality’ broadly conceived, as 
opposed to their specific goal of greater equality of outcome. If the liberal then 
interprets the argument in terms of their own belief in equal worth and accepts it, the 
socialist has successfully reconciled the two distinct demands under a single umbrella 
concept and ideological identification is established. Consubstantiality may also be 
achieved if the representatives of one party appeal to their (prospective) coalition 
partner’s core commitments in making the case for a favoured objective, even if they do 
not share those values themselves. This form of rhetorical strategising may afford an 
effective means of redefining the situation but, in practice, a party is constrained by the 
argumentative logics of its own ideology. In other words, if it moves the dispute too far 
onto the partner’s territory it endangers its future bargaining power, while risking the 
wrath of its supporters. The preservation of ideological distinctiveness thus becomes a 
matter of partisan interest.      
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As noted above, ideology shapes a party’s view of what constitutes an acceptable 
common ground with the (prospective) coalition partner. This conception is closely 
linked to the party’s vision for the nation’s future, and in turn affects the range of 
available identification strategies. Taking the 2010 UK general election manifestos as an 
example, the three main parties committed themselves to the goal of building a stronger 
society. To this end, the Liberal Democrats (2010: 9) advocated a fairer distribution of 
power, ‘be it economic, social, political or financial’, while the Conservative Party  
(2010: viii) pledged to promote individual and social responsibility and Labour (2010: 
3) asserted that ‘active, reforming government … helps make people powerful’. 
Although prima facie different, the Liberal Democrat and Conservative visions are 
founded on a belief in limited government. This commitment is central to their 
conceptions of a beneficial arrangement, as it affords them a means of promoting their 
respective goals of greater freedom and responsibility. Indeed, the party leaderships 
achieved ideological identification during the initial negotiations by linking limited 
government to reductions in public expenditure. Once in office, their consubstantiality 
facilitated co-operation on a programme of austerity intended to reduce the size of the 
state (Atkins, 2015: 87). By contrast, and despite their shared belief in individual 
empowerment, identification between the Liberal Democrats and Labour would have 
been difficult. Due to the latter’s commitment to state intervention, the quest for 
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common ideological ground would demand substantial compromise, the limits of which 
are largely determined by the willingness of party members to accept the dilution of 
their core values (see Laver and Schofield, 1998: 24). Considerations of party unity are 
likely to come into play at this point, highlighting the importance of interests in 
coalition bargaining. 
 
Instrumental identification and division 
 
As Hajer points out (1997: 59), language ‘influences the perception of interests and 
preference. Interests … cannot be assumed as given. Interests are intersubjectively 
constituted through discourse’. It follows that political parties engage in internal 
dialogues about the nature of their political environment, and what their interests are in 
these circumstances. Given that parties comprise different factions and thus are not 
unitary actors, strategies of identification and division will be employed until a 
compromise is reached. Thus, on entering into coalition negotiations, each team will 
bring with it a predefined conception of their party’s interests and will seek to achieve 
identification on this basis. As the talks take place within conditions of ambiguity, it is 
possible that, through dialogue, the actors involved will discover shared interests, and 
that these in turn will provide a starting point for inter-party agreement and co-operation 
during the governance stage. However, there is a persistent tension between these 
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newly-discovered coalition interests and pre-constituted partisan interests, which the 
actors must manage if they are to sustain the partnership while preserving their party’s 
distinct identity. It is here that the instrumental forms of identification and division 
come into play, as we will see next.                     
 
At the formation stage, the primary goal is to form an administration. After all, it is 
widely acknowledged that parties prefer government to opposition, and so ‘office may 
be valued not only because of its intrinsic qualities but because it is a necessary 
prerequisite for exercising policy influence’ (Verzichelli, 2008: 237). The negotiating 
parties will therefore seek to invite identification based on a common interest in 
achieving power, though the form the government will take is far from certain. So, for 
instance, one party may see a full coalition as the optimal means of achieving its goals, 
while the other may be undecided. Using a terministic screen, the former will define the 
situation so that a coalition appears to be the only viable option, perhaps by calling 
attention to the need for stability in the face of a national crisis or to the perceived 
weakness of minority governments. If the latter is persuaded that a coalition is the best 
course of action, in terms of enhancing its public image, say, or maximising 
governmental effectiveness, then instrumental identification has been achieved and the 
parties are consubstantial.       
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The governing partners may also share an interest in sustaining the coalition for the 
duration of the parliamentary term. In the UK, for example, senior Conservative figures 
believed a substantial period in government would add to their party’s authority, while 
some leading Liberal Democrats were eager to avoid an early general election for 
financial reasons (Wilson, 2010: 176, 140). Although the two parties were 
instrumentally identified on the need for coalition stability, a major concern for each in 
the governance stage is to ‘enhance their party’s electoral prospects and avoid decisions 
that will have adverse electoral implications’ (Müller et al., 2008: 11). As Laver and 
Schofield explain (1998: 187), ‘parties may lose votes if they appear to exert no 
influence over policy … [perhaps] by going into a government that enacts policies that 
differ from those that they promised at election time’. This highlights the importance of 
maintaining party distinctiveness, particularly for the junior partner whose role in the 
coalition may be less visible to the electorate (Boston and Bullock, 2012). Thus, the 
smaller party will need to emphasise the discontinuity between their predefined interests 
and certain policy commitments associated with the senior partner, and so foster 
instrumental division between them.   
      
Additionally, the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats attained instrumental 
identification based on a mutually acceptable understanding of the ‘national interest’ 
(Atkins, 2015). This is evident in their claim that the gravity of Britain’s economic 
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difficulties demanded the two parties should ‘put aside their differences on economic 
policy and work together in the national interest to heal the national finances and 
rebalance the economy’ (Gamble, 2012: 67). Specifically, the party leaderships defined 
the 2008 global financial crisis as a ‘crisis of debt’ which, they argued, was caused by 
the alleged fiscal irresponsibility of the previous Labour governments and could only be 
addressed by significant cuts to public spending. This narrative incorporated elements 
from domains such as economics, politics and social policy, and so simplified the crisis 
while giving it an apparent coherence. The deficit thus functioned as a narrative that, 
through repetition, became the received understanding of the situation (Gamble, 2012: 
67). In an example of identification through antithesis (Burke, 1972: 28), this economic 
narrative also enabled the coalition partners to overcome their differences and to unite 
behind the cause of deficit reduction in opposition to a common enemy, namely the 
Labour Party.           
 
Interpersonal identification and division 
 
This form of identification is concerned with the relations between individuals or 
groups. It is pertinent to the study of coalition politics because  
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Uncertainty about the credibility and opportunism of (potential) coalition 
partners are particular problems in coalition bargaining processes, especially as 
parliamentary parties are at least in partial competition with each other and 
because party leaders need to win the support of their backbenchers for inter-
party agreements at leadership level (Saalfeld, 2008: 335).  
 
Therefore, the parties must endeavour to build a rapport with the prospective partner. A 
failure to do so may increase the risk of personal conflict and early cabinet termination, 
though as Damgaard points out (2008: 312), the latter phenomenon is often 
overdetermined and ‘many of the participants [in the government] have strategic 
reasons to conceal the real forces at work’. With this caveat in mind, we turn to the 
interpersonal aspect of the negotiation dialogue that characterises coalition politics.        
  
The interpersonal mode of identification and division encompasses such continua as 
trust-mistrust, admiration-disapproval and respect-disrespect. It is somewhat nebulous 
in comparison to the ideological and instrumental forms, as it stems from personal 
chemistry (or a lack thereof) as much as it does from rhetorical strategising. 
Nevertheless, these sentiments can be created rhetorically, perhaps through the use of a 
terministic screen that demonstrates a similar understanding of the issue at hand or 
through the giving of the signs of consubstantiality. They can also arise as ‘a by-product 
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of a situation which has other chief aims’ (Brockriede, 1968: 2), among which may be 
the establishment of another form of identification. For the purposes of this discussion, 
the goals of interpersonal identification and division are termed ‘rapport’ and ‘friction’ 
respectively.           
 
Rapport is an important consideration when selecting a negotiating team, as the leader 
and the wider membership need to trust the participants to represent their party’s values 
and interests, and so to bargain effectively on their behalf. While all three UK parties 
chose their negotiators on this basis (Laws, 2010: 14-15; Wilson, 2010: 52; Adonis, 
2013: 33) the Liberal Democrats were the best prepared, having assembled their team in 
late 2009 (Laws, 2010: 13). Consequently, the negotiators were able to build a rapport 
and reach a shared understanding of their party’s interests in advance of the general 
election. A significant omission from the team was Vince Cable, the Treasury 
Spokesperson, which Adonis attributes (2013: 83) to a difficult relationship with the 
Liberal Democrat leader, Nick Clegg. However, Cable’s absence ensured that ‘none of 
the prominent figures from the left were included in the negotiating team’ (Wilson, 
2010: 37), which arguably facilitated the party’s talks with the Conservatives. 
 
During the formation stage, former adversaries need to ascertain whether they can 
govern together. The creation of rapport is vital here, and to this end the members of a 
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negotiating team must persuade their counterparts that they take the talks seriously and, 
moreover, are receptive to the idea of forming a partnership. Such an attempt at 
interpersonal identification was evident in the 2010 negotiations4, which opened with 
William Hague (quoted in Laws, 2010: 67) telling the Liberal Democrats that the 
Conservatives ‘sincerely want this to work’. This declaration set the tone for the talks, 
and indeed David Laws (2010: 67; see also Wilson, 2010: 105) was gratified to discover 
that the Conservative negotiators were ‘able to engage in a sensible, mature and 
respectful way with our team’. The participants’ demonstrations of an open, 
constructive attitude thus enabled them to establish rapport, which was mirrored in the 
warm relationship between Clegg and the Conservative leader, David Cameron (Paun, 
2011: 254). While important for coalition formation and unity, this interpersonal 
identification would contribute to a loss of electoral distinctiveness for the Liberal 
Democrats, who by late 2010 were widely seen as ‘a gang of Tory stooges’ following 
their U-turn on university tuition fees (d’Ancona, 2013: 64). So, although some inter-
party friction at the senior level can provide a basis for differentiation, too much can 
impede the functioning of government and perhaps result in its early termination 
(Damgaard, 2008: 304).       
 
Interpersonal friction was a key factor in the Liberal Democrats’ decision not to enter 
into coalition with Labour. As Clegg puts it (quoted in Laws 2010: 122; see also 
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Adonis, 2013: 5), the Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, was ‘impossible to deal with’, 
while Laws claims (2010: 273-4) that Labour’s negotiating team ‘seemed determined to 
wreck or undermine the very talks which they were engaged in’. However, the Labour 
negotiator Andrew Adonis challenges Laws’s account, speculating that the Liberal 
Democrats used interpersonal division as an alibi for their decision to go with the 
Conservatives, rather than form a progressive alliance with Labour (2013: 154; see also 
Wilson, 2010: 77). Nevertheless, the friction between Clegg and Brown is well 
documented and this, in conjunction with the Liberal Democrats’ concern that a ‘traffic 
light coalition’ would soon fall apart (Laws, 2010: 158), effectively ruled out a 
governing partnership with Labour. Interpersonal and instrumental divisions thus 
outweighed the parties’ apparent ideological convergence on economic policy and 
electoral reform (see Adonis, 2013: 27).   
 
It is worth noting that the three modes of identification and division are neither 
hierarchical nor mutually exclusive, as the complexities of real-world politics mean that 
their importance will vary between different negotiations. This is due to such factors as 
how the parties defined their interests, the strength of their commitment to ‘red line’ 
issues, and the degree of rapport between their representatives. Additionally, more than 
one form of identification or division may be at work within the same rhetorical 
situation. Indeed, the presence (or absence) of interpersonal identification ‘may have a 
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profound influence on whether other dimensions vary, as well as on how they vary’ 
(Brockriede, 1968: 2). Similarly, these conditions of ambiguity entail that the 
imperatives of unity and distinctiveness are present within all three of the modes 
discussed above, making this framework a useful tool for investigating the rhetorical 
dynamics of coalition bargaining. The next section applies the framework to the 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat negotiations on electoral reform.   
 
The UK coalition negotiations: Electoral reform 
 
Electoral reform was the most contentious issue in the negotiations, which took place 
between 7 and 11 May 2010. In their manifesto, the Conservative Party (2010: 67) 
supported the first-past-the-post system for general elections because it ‘gives voters the 
chance to kick out a government they are fed up with’. This position is founded on a 
‘populist’ notion of fairness, which demands that ‘voters, not party leaders, should 
choose governments’. Post-election bargaining is therefore seen as unfair because it 
removes the power to choose a government from the electorate and places it in the 
hands of party leaders (Blau, 2004: 167). The Conservatives (2010: 67) also committed 
themselves to ‘fair vote’ reforms, pledging to ‘equalise the size of constituency 
electorates’ and ‘conduct a boundary review to implement these changes within five 
years’. These measures drew on a distributive conception of fairness, according to 
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which every MP should represent an equal number of voters and each citizen’s ballot 
carries the same weight. Reinforcing the ideological commitment to these proposals was 
a belief that first-past-the-post served the Conservatives’ interests by giving them 
‘regular opportunities to hold power’ as a majority government, and that the boundary 
changes would work to their advantage (Laws, 2016: 88; Hazell and Yong, 2012: 159-
60). 
 
Like the Conservatives, the Liberal Democrats (2010: 87-8) promised to introduce ‘fair 
votes’, but they differed in their view of how this was to be achieved. Specifically, their 
manifesto advocated proportional representation for Westminster elections in the form 
of the Single Transferable Vote system, which would also reduce the number of 
parliamentary seats by 150. This proposal is based on the ‘equality’ conception of 
fairness, which requires that ‘each citizen and party should be treated equally, as in the 
idea of “one person, one vote, one value”’ (Blau, 2004: 167). As such, it is consistent 
with the core liberal belief in the equal worth of all individuals. The Liberal Democrats 
also had partisan interests involved, as they believed a change in the electoral system 
would compensate for the loss of support resulting from their participation in a coalition 
government (Rennard in Laws, 2016: 86; d’Ancona, 2013: 75). So, although both 
parties justified their proposed political reforms in terms of fairness, their divergent 
22 
 
understandings of this contested concept entailed different means of achieving their 
objectives.  
  
The Liberal Democrats have a longstanding commitment to electoral reform, and indeed 
it would be a ‘bottom-line negotiating issue’ in any coalition talks (Laws, 2010: 88). 
Before the general election, Laws had advised Clegg and the members of the 
negotiating team that there was only one way of persuading the Conservatives, to whom 
proportional representation was anathema, to accept a referendum on reform for 
Westminster elections. This was to  
 
Push for a referendum on the most modest form of electoral reform – the 
Alternative Vote … and to link this to Lib Dem support for the Conservatives’ 
own reform plan, which was to reduce the number of parliamentary seats and to 
remove Labour over-representation (paraphrased in Laws, 2010: 100; see also 
Wilson, 2010: 161).  
 
In Burke’s terms, Laws’s strategy involved using a terministic screen based on 
continuity to join the two parties’ proposals together. This would then provide a basis 
for instrumental identification by offering the Conservatives ‘something which would 
be likely to offset any loss of seats that AV might deliver’ (Laws, 2010: 100). Equally, 
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and given that the Liberal Democrats regarded AV as a fairer system than first-past-the-
post, this proposal represented an ideologically acceptable compromise. It also accorded 
with their perceived partisan interests; indeed Clegg has described AV as a ‘baby step in 
the right direction’ towards the reform of Westminster elections (quoted in Wilson, 
2010: 25). 
 
In the event, the 2010 general election produced a hung parliament with the 
Conservatives as the largest party. In the light of their divergent views on electoral 
reform it is unsurprising that the talks between the Conservatives and Liberal 
Democrats soon became deadlocked, jeopardising their preferred option of a partnership 
government (Wilson, 2010: 164; Laws, 2010: 99-100). Both had instrumental reasons 
for favouring this outcome, with Cameron believing a coalition would deflect attention 
from the Conservatives’ failure to win an outright majority, while the Liberal 
Democrats ‘had a vested interest in showing the public that coalitions could work in 
practice’ (Hazell and Yong, 2012: 31). The latter had already ruled out a confidence and 
supply arrangement, as it would result in them ‘taking no credit for the government’s 
achievements, but all the pain for sustaining it in office’ (Huhne quoted in Laws, 2010: 
18; Clegg, 2016: 147) and therefore damage their electoral interests.      
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Thus, on 9 May, the Liberal Democrats implemented Laws’s strategy, and Danny 
Alexander (quoted in Laws, 2010: 101) told the Conservative team that ‘we will support 
your proposals on redrawing the constituency boundaries, to make voting fairer. But in 
return, we want your support for a referendum on a reformed first-past-the-post 
system’.5 Here, he employed a terministic screen that directed his listeners’ attention to 
the continuity between AV and the existing electoral system (viz. ‘reformed first-past-
the-post’). In this way, Alexander perhaps sought to downplay the impact of the change 
and make it more palatable to the Conservatives. Likewise, by bringing together these 
demands under the umbrella of ‘fairness’ (broadly conceived), the Liberal Democrats 
invited ideological identification, on which basis the parties could work together to 
‘usher in a new and more co-operative politics and a fairer voting system’(Alexander, 
paraphrased in Laws, 2010: 101).     
 
However, Alexander’s effort to redefine the issue of voting reform was rejected, with 
Hague asserting (quoted in Laws, 2010: 101) that ‘the Conservatives are opposed as a 
party to both the Alternative Vote and proportional representation. And calling AV 
“reformed first-past-the-post” won’t change our people’s minds!’. Here, Hague was 
constrained by the argumentative logics of Conservative ideology, specifically its 
commitment to preserve traditional institutions. As such, the Liberal Democrats’ 
attempt to invite identification was unsuccessful, and they therefore had to change their 
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tactics. It was perhaps with this ideological constraint in mind that Laws responded 
(quoted in Laws, 2010: 102):  
 
Surely most Conservative MPs are opposed to PR and not AV? AV is a far more 
incremental and modest change. And in a coalition, the old assumptions on how 
people use their second preferences could change. AV might not be bad for the 
Conservatives under those circumstances. 
 
With these words, Laws appealed to both the Conservatives’ belief in gradual change 
and their electoral interests, and so sought to persuade them to identify ideologically 
and instrumentally with the Liberal Democrats on their proposals for a referendum on 
AV.   
 
Again, this identification strategy was unsuccessful and the talks reached an impasse. 
For George Osborne, ‘the best Conservative offer on this is going to be equalisation of 
seat size and a free vote in the Commons on an AV referendum’, while Laws’s position 
was that: ‘We cannot persuade Lib Dem MPs to vote for a Lib Dem-Conservative 
coalition without [electoral reform]’ (both quoted in Laws, 2010: 103; see also Wilson, 
2010: 162-3). Faced with the prospect of the Liberal Democrats reaching an agreement 
with Labour, on 10 May David Cameron sought the assent of his parliamentary party to 
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offer a referendum on AV (Wilson, 2010: 219; Kavanagh and Cowley, 2010: 213-14). 
While a number of senior figures supported the move, in general Conservative MPs 
adhere to the traditional view of the constitution. As such, they ‘do not regard the 
political system as broken and, if there is to be change, it should be incremental, 
tackling proven ills, not radical change fundamentally challenging the basics of a 
nation’s constitutional underpinnings’ (Norton and Thompson, 2015: 130). In essence, 
the parliamentary Conservative Party faced a choice between pragmatism and 
principles. 
 
To persuade MPs to support the offer of a referendum, the Conservative grandee Sir 
Malcolm Rifkind invited (quoted in Wilson, 2010: 220) instrumental identification 
based on a conception of the national interest: ‘The Conservative Party’s judgement has 
always been that in any crucial decision we have to address the public interest, not the 
party interest. And the public interest is economic stability’. Although many 
backbenchers had grave misgivings about crossing their party’s ‘red line’ on voting 
reform, few voiced their concerns and the Conservative leadership offered the Liberal 
Democrats a deal on AV (Wilson, 2010: 220-1; Kavanagh and Cowley, 2010: 214). In 
contrast, divisions within the Liberal Democrats centred on the choice of governing 
partner. Whereas those committed to a realignment of the centre-left favoured Labour 
(Clegg, 2016: 165; Laws, 2010: 197), the majority of MPs regarded a coalition with the 
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Conservatives as the best means of advancing their party’s interests. In Clegg’s words 
(2016: 178; see also Laws, 2010: 77):  
 
If we were ever to become a credible party of government, then we would need 
to show that we could govern in tough times, and finally put an end to the 
perception of us as a nice but ineffectual party of opposition.  
 
Thus, each parliamentary party was, for the most part, instrumentally consubstantial, but 
their identification was based on different grounds.                 
 
In its Programme for Government (HM Government, 2010: 26), the Coalition pledged 
to bring forward measures to create ‘fewer and more equal sized constituencies’ and to 
hold a referendum on AV. The Liberal Democrats had agreed to the proposed boundary 
changes because they were already committed to reducing the number of MPs, and they 
shared the Conservative Party’s belief that ‘the present unequal size of constituency 
electorates just wasn’t fair’ (Laws, 2010: 101). As such, they identified with the 
Conservatives’ ideological commitment to a distributive notion of fairness which, like 
their own conception of fairness as equality, is founded on the idea that every vote 
should carry the same weight. In short, the two parties had succeeded in finding a 
mutually acceptable common ground. However, the Liberal Democrats failed to achieve 
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ideological identification on AV. This is because the equality conception of fairness 
tends to clash with the populist idea endorsed by the Conservatives, as ‘fairness in 
translating votes to seats may lead to unfairness in translating seats to power’ (Blau, 
2004: 173). Thus, the inherent ambiguity of ‘fairness’ that had enabled the parties to 
achieve consubstantiality on the issue of equalised boundaries prevented them from 
attaining ideological identification on electoral reform. On this issue, the Conservatives 
and Liberal Democrats instead were instrumentally consubstantial, as an agreement 
would enable the parties not only to take power, but to claim that they were acting in the 
national interest (Laws, 2010: 199; Wilson, 2010: 210-12). This in turn would enhance 
their standing in the eyes of the public, while contributing to the Coalition’s early 
narrative of governmental unity. 
 
Conclusion 
 
As Laver and Schofield observe (1998: 187), it has become common in coalition 
scholarship to conceive of policy bargaining as an attempt to ‘minimise the policy 
distance between a party’s ideal policy point and the policy point of the government’. A 
rhetorical analysis builds on this understanding by illuminating how, through strategies 
of identification and division, such compromises are reached, and how considerations of 
unity and distinctiveness influence both the choice of governing partner and subsequent 
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policy outcomes. The application of the framework reveals that the Conservatives and 
Liberal Democrats achieved identification in all three dimensions, which undoubtedly 
contributed to the Coalition’s survival for a full parliamentary term. While the prizes for 
Cameron included ‘government, not opposition; stability, not chaos; [and] joint 
responsibility for tough decisions’ (Laws, 2010: 51), the Liberal Democrats gravely 
overestimated the benefits they would derive from coalition. Their miscalculation 
resulted from an ideological and instrumental preoccupation with electoral reform, 
which blinded them to the possibility that they would lose the AV referendum. This is 
evident in Huhne’s statement that:  
 
Our historic mission is to create a British Liberal party whose influence will be 
embedded in our politics through a reformed voting system … Only a 
Conservative coalition now offers … the prize of a guaranteed place in British 
politics for a strong liberal force (quoted in Laws, 2010: 158).           
 
In their efforts to realise this goal, the Liberal Democrats broke a number of pre-election 
pledges, ‘most obviously over tuition fees, but also over the “U-turn” on dealing with 
the fiscal deficit’ (Hazell and Yong, 2012: 130). Their perceived partisan interest in 
making a success of coalition government thus resulted in an early loss of 
distinctiveness from which the party never recovered. 
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The framework opens up several avenues for further research. If we accept Lupia and 
Strøm’s claim (2008: 59) that, at any stage of a coalition’s life cycle, ‘coalition 
decisions are the result of bargaining’, then scholars might explore how its constituent 
parties employ the three modes of identification and division to manage the unity-
distinctiveness dilemma during the governance phase, or to reassert their unique 
identities in the run-up to a general election. Additionally, the negotiation dialogue that 
takes place within minority governments or surplus governments warrants academic 
attention, as much of the literature is concerned with minimal winning coalitions. 
Finally, the framework could guide analyses of coalition bargaining in democratic 
societies beyond the UK, and so pave the way for international comparative studies. 
Such research would complement existing scholarship on the bargaining process, while 
prising open the ‘black box’ of coalition politics a little further.  
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1 Laws’s account (2010: 9-10) is based on transcripts and detailed notes of the meetings, 
and the accuracy of his recollections is verified by others involved in the negotiations. 
The article draws primarily on this text though, as far as possible, only verbatim 
quotations are included in the analysis. For verification purposes, these are triangulated 
with other sources.  
2 This oversight is evident in Hajer and Laws’s (2006) discussion of ordering devices. 
Meanwhile, Black notes (2012: 196) that analyses of regulatory conversations should 
attend to the rhetorical techniques employed in the development and contestation of 
these understandings, but does not consider them herself. In contrast, rhetorical study 
‘explores the moments at which discursive “regimes” are introduced and reproduced 
through argument’, and so ‘permits analysis of concrete interventions that aspire to 
become effective, perhaps dominant discourses’ (Martin, 2014: 12).             
3 It is important to note that ‘political parties are themselves not unitary actors, so 
attention should also be paid to the priorities of different wings of the two movements’ 
(Paun, 2011: 258). 
4 The Conservative negotiators were the MPs William Hague, Oliver Letwin and 
George Osborne, and Cameron’s chief of staff, Ed Llewellyn, while the Liberal 
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Democrat team comprised the MPs Danny Alexander (chair), Chris Huhne, David Laws 
and Andrew Stunnell (Laws, 2010: 52-3).  
5 The argument that AV is a form of first-past-the-post was also made by Huhne and 
Clegg (Wilson, 2010: 162, 207), lending support to Laws’s account of the Liberal 
Democrats’ pre-election strategising.  
